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GOVERNMENTAL COMPENSATION FOR
RIOT VICTIMS
The tremendous increase in civil disorders and riots over the
last few years has sharpened the nation's focus on riot damages.'
Businessmen and home owners in many areas of our country have
suffered millions of dollars in losses at the hands of angry mobs.2
The national news media has reported the spiraling frequency of
riotous activity and the accompanying wake of personal injury and
property damage.3 In response to this growing concern, governmental
inquiries have examined the expanding arena of civil disorders
throughout the country.4 This comment will re-examine the role of
the federal, state and local governments in the protection of
California citizens against losses caused by riots.
STATUS OF CURRENT LAW
Statutes in a large number of states create county and city
liability for damages suffered as a result of civil disorders.' A few
riot recovery statutes allow recovery for personal injury,6 while the
greater number impose liability exclusively for property damage.
Because there is no common law right of recovery for damages
caused by mob violence, 8 municipalities are liable only where
1 See, e.g., WALL STREET JOURNAL, Aug. 31, 1967, at 1, col. 6. This article discusses
the problem of who should pay for riot losses and reports the fact that many states in
our nation have laws which make local governments liable for riot losses.
2 THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL ADVISORY PANEL ON INSURANCE IN RIOT-AFFECTED
AREAS. Hearings: Nov. 8 & 9, 1967, 159, 188-94.
3 See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, Aug. 30, 1965 at 13. This article discusses the spiraling
cost of riot losses.
4 See note 2 supra. See also Major Riots, Civil-Criminal Disorders, in PERMANENT
SUBCOM"n. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE U.S. SEN. CO s. ON Gov. OPERATIONS, RIOTS,
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL DISORDERS, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1967).
5 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-108 (1958); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-203 (Supp. 1968);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.100 (1942); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3354 (1964);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 82, §§ 1-3 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 269, § 8 (1958); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 537-150 (1949); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 11-1503 (1947); N.J. STAT.
ANN §§ 2A:48-1 to 2A:48-7 (1968); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3761.01-3761.11 (Supp.
1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11821 (1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-15-13 (1956);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-107 (1952); W. VA. CODE § 61-6-12 (1966); WIS. STAT. § 66.091
(1970).
6 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-108 (1958); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-203 (Supp. 1968);
Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 3761.08 (Supp. 1970); W. VA. CODE § 61-6-12 (1966); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 66.091 (1970).
7 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3354 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 82, §§ 1-3
(1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 269, § 8 (1958); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537-150 (1949);
MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 11-1503 (1947); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16 § 11821 (1965); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-15-13 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-107 (1952).
8 38 Am. JuR., Municipal Corporations § 652 (1941). Here it is stated that it is
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statutory provisions create such liability.' Such statutes have gener-
ally been upheld by the courts as a reasonable exercise of the police
power.10 Moreover, the courts have strictly construed such riot
statutes where they allow recovery for personal injury" and liberally
construed them where only property damages are recoverable. 2
The purpose of these riot recovery statutes is based essentially
upon the theoretical principles of protecting innocent citizens from
catastrophic loss and encouraging public officials to maintain the
highest degree of lawful order in the community. While the purposes
of these statutes are similar, there are some technical distinctions
worth noting. For example, of the riot statutes now in effect, only
those of Connecticut, Kansas and Wisconsin allow recovery for both
personal injury and property damages. 8 Statutes in Maryland,
Kentucky and Connecticut bar recovery where the resulting damage
could not have been prevented through reasonable diligence by local
authorities.14 In other states, the courts have held that riot statutes
apply only to property which is damaged or destroyed, and not to
property which is stolen because this merely represents an interfer-
ence with a "possessory right."'" Other distinctions among riot
well settled law that a municipality is not liable for damages resulting from mob vio-
lence in the absence of statutory provision creating such liability.
9 In City of Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313 (1911), the court upheld as con-
stitutional a statute which made local government entities liable for riot losses. Here
the court indicates that it is a familiar common law rule that a state which creates
subordinate municipal governments and vests in them police powers essential to the
preservation of law and order may impose upon them a duty of protecting property
from mob violence and hold them liable for loss caused by such violence.
10 But see Kelly v. Beckman, 13 Ohio Misc. 219, 234 N.E.2d 624 (1967), and
Parker v. Board of County Comm'rs, 15 Ohio App. 2d 77, 239 N.E.2d 127 (1968). In
Kelly v. Beckman, the court states that it was not enough to show simply an injury
resulting from an unlawful assemblage of persons. In order to recover there must also
appear a purpose of exercising correctional power by violence without authority of
law. If it were not so, stated the court, then the Ohio statute would be unconstitutional.
11 See, e.g., Halley v. City of Newark, 22 N.J. Misc. 139, 36 A.2d 210 (1944);
Lexa v. Zmunt, 123 Ohio St. 510, 176 N.E. 82 (1931); Lanham v. City of Buckhannon,
97 W. Va. 339, 125 S.E. 157 (1924) ; Landesman v. Board of County Comm'rs, 9 Ohio
App. 2d 319, 224 N.E.2d 532 (1967).
12 See, e.g., Roy v. Hampton, 108 N.H. 51, 226 A.2d 870 (1967); Yalenezian v.
City of Boston, 238 Mass. 538, 131 N.E. 220 (1921); Marshall v. City of Buffalo, 50
App. Div. 149, 64 N.Y.S. 411 (1900).
13 The following statutes allow for both personal injury and property damage
recovery: CONw. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 97 § 7-108 (1960); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-203
(Supp. 1968); WIS. STAT. ANN. ch. 66, § 66.091 (1965).
14 CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 7-108 (1958); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411,100 (1963);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 82 §§ 1-3 (1957). Contra, Palmer v. City of Concord, 48 N.H.
211 (1868). Here the issue before the court was whether the riot victim had given the
local authorities notice of the impending danger to his property. The court held that
such notice was not necessary and that it was no defense to show that the town
could not have prevented the destruction of the property, or that none of the rioters
were citizens of the town.
15 In Y lonozan v. City of Boston, 238 Xa55, 538, 131 N.E, 2?Q (1921), the
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recovery statutes appear in the various definitions of the terms "mob"
and "riot."" In fact, a few states seek to avoid confusion in this
respect by employing numerical definitions. 7
Despite technical variations which occasionally lead to unusual
court decisions,'8 most riot recovery statutes are substantially similar
to the California statute which was repealed in 196311 just two years
before the Watts riot in Los Angeles. ° The California statute
basically provided that a local agency is strictly liable for damages
caused by riots; 2 that in order to recover, a plaintiff must not be
contributorily negligent; 2 and that an action to recover for riot
damages must be commenced within one year after the riot."
Unfortunately, this riot liability statute was repealed in 1963 due to
the impact 24 of the Muskopf and Lipman cases decided by the
court distinguished property which is physically damaged from property which is
stolen during a riot and determined that stolen property was not damaged and thus
not covered by the state's riot statute. Accord, Goldman v. Forcier, 68 R.I. 291,
27 A.2d 340 (1942).
16 In Koska v. Kansas City, 123 Kan. 362, 255 P. 57 (1927), the court stated
that the term "mob" was not a strictly legal term and was practically synonymous
with "riot." In Landesman v. Board oj County Comm'rs, 9 Ohio App. 2d 319, 224
N.E.2d 532 (1967), the court stated that for purposes of the riot recovery statute,
the term "mob" was not to be used in its generic sense.
17 In Aron v. City of Wausau, 98 Wis. 592, 74 N.W. 354 (1898), the court said
that three persons were necessary to constitute a "mob" or "riot" under the state
riot statute. In Hibbs v. City of Wichita, 176 Kan. 529, 271 P.2d 791 (1954), the
court stated that five persons was the statutory minimum number of persons needed
to constitute a "mob."
18 E.g., Moore v. City of Wichita, 196 Kan. 636, 189 P. 372 (1920). Here off
duty police officers broke into plaintiff's house without a warrant, searched the
premises, physically injured the plaintiff and caused property damage. The court
determined that such illegal police actions were within the scope of the state's riot
statute.
19 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 50140-45 (West 1954), repealed, CAL. STATS. 1963 ch.
1681 § 18, at 3266 (1963) [hereinafter referred to as the riot recovery statute] provided
that a local agency is strictly liable for riot damages within its boundaries; that an
action for recovery be commenced within one year after the commission of the act com-
plained of; that a plaintiff must not be contributorily negligent; that payment of
riot losses shall be paid by issuance of a warrant; and that the prosecution of rioters
is the duty of the Attorney General of California.
20 The Watts riot in 1965 alone caused millions of dollars in property damage
and great human suffering. It was reported that 36 people died in the Watts rioting
and that nearly 900 were injured. Additionally, more than 4,000 persons were arrested
and estimates of property damage were set at 200 million dollars. See note 3 supra.
21 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50140 (West 1954), repealed, CAL. STATS. 1963 ch. 1681
§ 18, at 3266 (1963).
22 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50142 (West 1954), repealed, CAL. STATS. 1963 ch. 1681
§ 18, at 3266 (1963).
23 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50141 (West 1954), repealed, CAL. STATS. 1963 ch. 1681
§ 18, at 3266 (1963).
24 The California Law Revision Commission in its study of the impact of the
Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961), case recom-
mended sweeping legislative changes. For an extended discussion of these recommended
changes see 4 CAL. LAw REvISION COMM'N REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES
834-85 (1963).
SANTA CLARA LAWYER [Vol. 11
California Supreme Court in January of 1961.25 Prior to these
decisions, the doctrine of sovereign immunity protected governmental
entities against civil liability, except where statutory provisions
specifically imposed such liability. However, the Muskopi case
decided that this doctrine of sovereign immunity was "mistaken and
unjust," 6 and that liability was to become the general rule. Thus,
California's riot statute, which was originally designed27 as a
statutory waiver of government immunity, became a statutory
provision operating in a general scheme of government liability.
Unfortunately, the California Law Revision Commission, in its
review of legislation affected by the Muskop] decision, viewed the
riot statute as an "anachronism of modern law" and recommended
its repeal.2"
EFFECT OF REPEAL ON CALIFORNIA LAW
The repeal of California's riot recovery statute left thousands of
citizens without an effective avenue of recovery against riot losses.
Owing to the fact that civil disorders in California and elsewhere
are increasing, the repeal of the riot statute was misconceived and
contrary to the spirit of Muskopf.29 Moreover, the legislature, at the
time of the riot statute's repeal, enacted new laws8° which made riot
recovery against governmental entities virtually impossible. These
25 Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr.
89 (1961), and Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School District, 55 Cal. 2d 244, 359
P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1961).
26 In Muskopi v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1961), the court concluded that government immunity from tort liability
must be discarded as "mistaken and unjust." This decision reversed the long standing
principle that government entities were immune from civil liability for their torts
unless they were made liable by statute.
27 See A. VAN ALSTYNE, CAL. GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY § 2.15 (Cal. Con't
Ed. Bar 1964).
28 There exists an apparent paradox between the reasoning of the California
Supreme Court and the California Law Revision Commission with respect to their
viewpoints on sovereign immunity. In Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d
211, 213, 359 P.2d 457, 458, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 90 (1961), the court refers to govern-
ment immunity from tort liability as an "anachronism . ..which has existed only
by the force of inertia." On the other hand, the California Law Revision Commission
refers to the liability imposed by the riot recovery statute as an "anachronism of
modern law." 4 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES
818 (1963).
29 The spirit of Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457,
11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961), is that the public convenience should not outweigh individual
compensation when dealing with government tort liability.
80 E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 818.2 (West 1966), provides that a public entity is
not liable for injury caused by adopting or failing to adopt an enactment or by
failing to enforce any laws. See also Martelli v. Pollock, 162 Cal. App. 2d 655, 328
P.2d 795 (1958); and Rubinow v. County of San Bernardino, 169 Cal. App. 2d 67,
336 P.2d 968 (1959).
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statutes bar recovery against public entities and their employees,
where injury is caused by a negligent or intentional failure to enforce
the law.31 This immunity effectively insulates governmental entities
from responsibility for failure to protect California residents from
mob violence. Consequently, California businessmen and property
owners are left without recourse against any governmental entity,
even where riot damages are the direct result of the government's
wilful dereliction of duty. 2 Apparently, the convenience of avoiding
riot liability has out-weighed consideration for individual compensa-
tion. This abrupt reversal from strict liability to complete immunity
deserves careful re-examination.
PRESENT REMEDIES
It is certainly reasonable that an innocent property owner"3
should not have to bear the entire burden of riot losses. However,
the manner by which a riot victim receives compensation is open for
consideration. As will be seen, there are several remedies available
to the victim of riot losses. Unfortunately, a survey of such remedies
reveals that they provide inadequate protection against damages
caused by rioters.
Under California law the riot victim may have an avenue of
recovery against the rioters themselves. 4 The specific actions of
trespass, conversion, assault and battery offer the riot victim some
protection. However, difficulties in the identification of rioters and
the futility of a civil action against an indigent rioter render these
remedies impractical.
Yet, direct recourse against the rioters is not the only remedy.
A few states provide state compensation to the victims of crime .
5
California has such a compensation statute which offers limited
protection to California citizens.8" The purpose of the statute is to
31 Id.
82 Id.
33 For purposes of this discussion an innocent party is one who is not con-
tributorily negligent.
34 Cf. the theory of joint tortfeasers in Schaefer v. Berinstein, 140 Cal. App. 2d
278, 295 P.2d 113 (1956).
35 The following state laws are crime victim compensation statutes: HAwAIU
REv. LAWS ch. 351 (1968); MARLYLAND ANN. CODE art. 26A (Supp. 1970); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 258 A. (1968); N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 620-35 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
36 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 13960-66 (West Supp. 1971). This act provides that it is
in the public welfare to indemnify needy California residents for injuries suffered as
a result of the commission of crime; that a victim is one who is physically injured;
that a claim should be filed with the State Board of Control; that the claim must
be presented within one year of the date of injury or death; that the state has
subrogation rights against criminals; that the State Board of Control shall give
notice and have a hearing and determine whether to award an indemnification.
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indemnify those "needy" residents of the state who are victims of
crimes committed in California.87 Basically, it provides that a victim
who sustains personal injury as a result of a criminal act may be
compensated; that the state has subrogation rights against the
criminal; 8  that the Board of Control will determine whether
compensation is appropriate;89 and that $5,000 is the maximum any
victim may receive. 0 While the Crime Victim Act might in some
instances protect a riot victim from the expense of personal injury,
it would not protect most riot victims from property damage."
Furthermore, before any compensation is awarded, the Board of
Control must establish that the claimant is needy and that the injury
suffered was the direct result of the commission of a crime. 2 In
addition to these requirements, the absolute limit of compensation
under the act is $5,000.48 For these reasons, the Crime Victim Act
does not provide adequate protection against riot damage to
California citizens.
Another avenue of riot recovery may exist if the victim has
extended coverage insurance which protects against riot damages.4
Unfortunately, the weaknesses of the private insurance remedy are
numerous. For example, the term "extended coverage" refers to
coverage in addition to the standard insurance policy and, hence,
normally involves additional cost." Consequently, a home owner or
businessman who cannot afford 46 an extended coverage endorsement
may have no riot damage protection. While it is true that state
regulations guard against unfair premiums, such regulations do not
guarantee that insurance will be within the insured's means. 7
Indeed, there is considerable evidence which indicates that securing
87 Id. § 13960.
88 Id. § 13963.
89 Id.
40 Id.
41 The thrust of the California Crime Victim Act is toward providing compensa-
tion for personal injuries. Compensation for damaged property may be given only if
such damage occurred while the victim was acting to prevent the commission of a
crime. Id. §§ 13960-74.
42 Id. § 13963.
48 Id.
44 Meeting the Insurance Crisis of Our Cities. A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S
NATIONAL ADVISORY PANEL ON INSURANCE IN RIOT-AFFECTED AREAS 19-20 (1968).
45 Id. at 19.
46 The report by the President's National Advisory Panel on Insurance states
that consumer complaints about the high cost of property insurance were a recurring
theme of their field interviews. It was also reported that many property owners in
the urban core area pay two to three times the standard rates for insurance coverage
and that rates may run as high as ten times the standard cost. Id. at 152-53.
47 Id. at 48-49. Most states provide that insurance rates shall not be "excessive,
inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory." However, state regulation does not guarantee
that insurance will be within the insured's means. It merely serves to regulate rates
so that the cost is not excessive in relation to the risk assumed by the company.
[Vol. I11
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insurance protection is virtually impossible for sizable numbers of
citizens.4 s In fact, the President's National Advisory Panel on
Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas reported that insurance companies
view the urban core market as undesirable business and generally
endeavor to avoid it.49 The high cost of riot coverage and the
reluctance of the insurance industry to write insurance in high risk
areas results in an unfair distribution of insurance protection.
While it is true that steps have been taken to provide for greater
availability of extended coverage insurance, these efforts represent
only a partial solution to a larger problem. For instance, the Urban
Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968,5° which encour-
ages private industry to make insurance coverage available to people
in urban areas, does nothing for those citizens who cannot afford the
luxury of insurance. For these people and others,5 ' the only practical
protection against riot damage lies with the government.
RE-EXAMINATION OF MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
For nearly a century, the California riot recovery statute played
an important role 2 in the protection of California residents against
losses caused by riots. Yet today there is an apparent lack of
protection for citizens against such losses.
Various arguments have been presented supporting municipal
liability for riot losses.58 The underlying theories supporting these
arguments are based on two major principles: (a) protecting the
individual property owner against riot losses for which there may be
no other legal redress; 54 and (b) placing pressure on the local
48 Id. at 53.
49 Id. The report concludes that insurance is difficult to obtain because the
insurance industry makes an effort to avoid urban core business.
50 12 U.S.C. §§ 1749bbb, 1749bbb-21 (1968). This statute is commonly called
the Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968. It provides government
reinsurance for companies who qualify and will write high risk insurance in areas
where insurance is normally difficult to obtain.
51 Many California citizens cannot secure insurance coverage because their
coverage has been cancelled or because they live in an area where new insurance
coverage is not offered. See note 48 supra.
52 While the California riot recovery statute saw little use in its near one
hundred year history, it did nevertheless afford protection to all California citizens.
See e.g., Agudo v. County of Monterey, 13 Cal. 2d 285, 89 P.2d 400 (1939); Bank
of California v. Shaber, 55 Cal. 322 (1880); Clear Lake Water Works Co. v. Lake
County, 45 Cal. 90 (1872); Fong Yuen Ling, Sam Yuen, Yin Tuck and Ah Yung v.
The Mayor and Common Council of the City of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. 531 (1874).
53 See David, Municipal Liability in Tort in California, 7 So. CAL. L. REV. 372
(1934).
54 In City of Madisonville v. Bishop, 113 Ky. 106, 67 S.W. 269 (1902), the
court states that protecting the individual from loss due to riots is a principle pur-
pose underlying riot recovery statutes. Accord, Roy v. Hampton, 108 N.H. 51, 226
A.2d 870 (1967).
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governmental body to maintain the highest degree of law and justice
so as to minimize its liability for damage.5 Among the chief argu-
ments against municipal liability for riot losses are the following:
(a) liability does not promote a high degree of law and order;
(b) private insurance coverage is sufficient; and (c) municipal riot
liability may be too expensive for municipalities. In order to
understand the value of municipal riot liability, some study must be
given to the arguments against such liability.
While there are no studies which prove that municipal liability
for riot losses pressures local government to maintain a high degree
of law and justice, it seems logical that liability would have such an
effect. Implicit in this argument is the notion that local taxpayers
will stimulate local authorities toward the solution of existing social
problems which invariably lead to violence.56 Local governmental
riot liability would serve as a deterrent to riots because it places the
expense of riot losses squarely on the shoulders of the local taxpayer.
Consequently, local taxpayers, in order to avoid the additional tax
burdens resulting from riot damage, are encouraged to become
involved in the community by dealing with problems which might
lead to mob violence.
The next major criticism of municipal riot liability suggests that
private insurance offers sufficient protection against damage caused
by riots. This argument is entirely inadequate because a significant
number of persons cannot secure insurance protection.17 For this
group of people there is little, if any, practical recourse58 for riot
losses and, in effect, they are left at the mercy of the mob. 9
The final argument against municipal riot liability deserves
careful consideration. This argument suggests that liability for riot
losses is potentially too costly for local governments, especially in
large cities where there is a shift in population and wealth to the
suburbs. However, the question of potential expense is really a ques-
tion of statutory regulation because the extent of municipal riot
liability can be carefully controlled.6" For example, municipal riot
55 In Yalenezian v. City of Boston, 238 Mass. 596, 131 N.E. 220 (1921), the
court indicates that a purpose of local government riot liability is to place pressure
on the local government to maintain a high degree of law and order. Accord, City
of Madisonville v. Bishop, 113 Ky. 106, 67 S.W. 269 (1902).
56 See, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS,
(1968), for a study of riots and their causes.
57 See notes 48, 49 & 50 supra.
58 Difficulties in the identification of rioters and the possibility of indigent
rioters make civil actions in trespass, conversion, assault and battery generally inef-
fective.
59 This situation is especially unfortunate in California where residents have
enjoyed riot recovery protection for nearly a century.
60 California presents an extreme example of how well legislation can protect
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liability could be limited by statutory provision to a fixed percentage
of the actual loss suffered, as is the case in Maine.6 Or municipalities
could be given subrogation rights against the rioters themselves, as
is specifically allowed in Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Ohio,
Rhode Island and Wisconsin.62 Further, protection could be given
the municipality by limiting recovery to situations where the city is
negligent in its duties,63 or where notice of impending danger is given
to the city.64 Therefore, since the extent of riot liability can be
carefully limited by statute, the argument against municipal liability
on the grounds of expense is poorly reasoned and contrary to past
experience. 65
PROPOSALS FOR NEW LEGISLATION
Because the arguments against municipal riot liability appear
weak in contrast to the effective relief afforded by a riot recovery
statute,6 6 the question arises as to what type of legislation would
best serve the interests of California residents.
The repealed California strict liability riot statute was perhaps
too sweeping in the liability which it imposed upon municipal and
county governments. 7 For this reason, new state legislation could be
drafted to protect local government from over-extended liability.
This might be achieved by limiting recovery to 75 percent of the
actual losses suffered, and providing a $50 deductible clause, as is
done in Massachusetts.' Such provisions have the two-fold effect of
providing a remedy against catastrophic loss for riot victims while
protecting the municipality against limitless liability. Similarly, a
provision granting subrogation rights to the city against individual
rioters 9 would act to protect both the public and the financial
the government from unwanted liability. However, it seems only fair that local
government entities should accept liability where their negligence has directly caused
the damages suffered.
61 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3354 (1964).
62 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3354 (1964); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 269, § 8
(1958); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537-150 (1949); Onro REV. CODE ANN. § 3761.08 (Supp.
1970); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-15-13 (1956); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.091 (1970).
63 This limitation on recovery is seen in the following statutes: CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 7-108 (1958); MD. ANN. CODE art. 82, §§ 1-3 (1957); KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 12-203 (Supp. 1968); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.100 (1942).
64 Such a provision would protect the municipality from liability for riot damage
for which it had no previous warning and thus no way of knowing that protection
was needed.
65 There have been few reported cases where the California riot recovery statute
was used as the basis for recovery. For a listing of these cases, see note 51 supra.
66 See notes 54 & 55 supra.
67 See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 50140-45 (West 1954), repealed, CAL. STATS. 1963 ch.
1681 § 18, at 3266 (1963).
68 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 269, § 8 (1968).
69 Wis. STAT. ANN. ch. 66, § 66.091 (1965), has such a subrogation clause.
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integrity of the municipality. Such a provision would also insure
renewed diligence on the part of law enforcement in the investigation
and arrest of rioters.
However, such proposals alone are not enough. The problem of
nationwide riot damages and the grievances underlying their occur-
rence indicate that riot recovery legislation is a nationwide concern. 0
In the last few years federal involvement in the control of criminal
activity and its underlying causes has been the subject of consider-
able legislation.71 Against this background it is entirely appropriate
that the federal government enact legislation protecting United
States residents against losses caused by riots.
The structure of federal riot legislation could be modeled after
the following example:
Section 1. Declaration of Purpose.
The Congress hereby declares that it is in the publics best in-
terest and welfare to indemnify innocent residents of the
United States against personal injury and property damage
caused by riots within the United States.
Section 2. Victim of Riot Defined.
A victim of riot damage as used in this legislation is any United
States resident who suffers either personal injury or property
damage as a direct consequence of riot activity.
A. For purpose of this legislation, an innocent United States
resident is one who is not contributorily negligent respect-
ing the damages suffered.
Section 3. Riot Defined.
For purposes of this legislation, a riot is defined as any use of
force or violence disturbing the public peace by five or more
persons acting together without authority of law.
Section 4. Administration of the Act.
A Federal Riot Recovery Commission is created by this act to
hear and award claims of United States residents seeking relief
from riot losses. The Federal Riot Recovery Commission shall
be a three member tribunal appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate.
Section 5. Filing of Claim; Report of Attorney General; Amount of
Recovery.
Upon presentation of a claim of riot injury, the Federal Riot
70 Riot recovery legislation is properly a national concern because many of the
problems underlying riots are national in scope. For example, the war in Southeast
Asia, civil rights and equal opportunity for minority groups are problems which
cannot be solved by local governments alone.
71 See, e.g., The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3701-3781 (1968), which is federal legislation concerned with the control
of criminal activity throughout the nation. See also The Economic Opportunity Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2994 (1964), which seeks to improve the social conditions
which lead to criminal activity.
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Recovery Commission shall fix a time and place for the hearing
of the claim, and send notice thereof to interested parties and
to the United States Attorney General. Prior to such hearing,
the United States Attorney General shall investigate the facts
of each claim. At the hearing the Attorney General shall sub-
mit to the commission evidence showing:
A. The nature of the circumstances involved;
B. The direct relationship between riot activity and the losses
complained of;
C. The extent of injury; and
D. Other evidence as the board may require. The Federal
Riot Recovery Commission will then reach a decision con-
cerning the amount of award, if any. The Commission
may reduce the award to the extent that the claimant has
received indemnification from any other source.
Section 6. Mutuality of Federal and Local Liability.
Under this act, the federal government shares liability for riot
losses with the municipality or municipalities within whose
boundaries the damage complained of occurred. A municipal-
ity's annual liability under this act shall not exceed five percent
of the municipality's annual tax revenues. The remaining cost
of riot recovery shall be assumed by the federal government.
Section 7. Subrogation Rights and Payment of Claims.
If a claim is paid under this act, the municipal government(s)
shall be subrogated to the rights of the claimant to whom such
claim was paid.
Federal payment of awards under this act shall be paid
from a separate appropriation made to the Federal Riot Re-
covery Commission from the federal budget. Municipal pay-
ment of awards under this act shall be paid out of existing
revenues or by the levy and collection of taxes for payment of
awards.
The purpose of such federal legislation is to guarantee adequate
protection to all innocent victims against riots and to act as a
deterrent against their occurrence. Such a deterrent effect is best
achieved by making the local governmental entity mutually liable
with the federal government for riot losses.72 The liability imposed
on local governments would, however, be limited to a small percent-
age of the local entity's yearly tax revenues. Such a measure pro-
tects local government from limitless liability while preserving the
riot deterrent effect which only local liability can produce.
Aside from the fact that federal legislation could provide
complete protection to riot victims and act to deter the occurrence
72 The deterrent effect is only brought about when the local community is
aware of its liability for riot losses and therefore, as a means of escaping such liability,
sets up machinery to solve grievances which might lead to riots. If there is no special
local government liability for riot losses, then there is no financial threat which will
stimulate community involvement.
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of future riots, other benefits would also be achieved. For example,
the basic expense of riot compensation would be spread among the
largest number of persons, thus reducing the costliness of riot
damages for everyone concerned. Moreover, such a program of
shared responsibility between the federal and local governments
would serve to generate greater cooperation in such areas as
grievance machinery, police training and riot control techniques.
The apparent benefits accruing from federal riot recovery legislation
make such legislation a necessity to the public interest. In fact, the
moral obligation of the federal government in the protection of
innocent riot victims is at least as compelling as its duty in the cap-
ture and punishment of criminals. For these reasons, a federal riot
compensation act, as outlined earlier, should be enacted for the
protection of innocent United States residents against riot losses.
CONCLUSION
Presently in California and other states, millions of innocent
citizens are unprotected against potential damage caused by riots. In
many states there exists no governmental liability for losses incurred
through riots because such liability is not part of the common law
and must be established by statute.7" Frequently, other legal avenues
of recovery prove to be impractical and ineffective.74 Furthermore,
the commercial insurance remedy is inadequate because many
persons cannot afford it or because it is simply not available in their
geographical area.75 Consequently, the innocent victims of riot
damage must look to the equitable hand of government to protect
their interests against the destructiveness of mob violence.
Robert H. Harmssen
73 See notes 8 & 9 supra.
74 See text accompanying notes 33-51 supra.
75 See notes 47, 48 & 49 supra.
